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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs~ 
CARLOS JOHNSON and RUTH L. 
JOHNSON, his wife; FIRST 
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A.; 
IDEAL NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
CASE NO. 217794 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff initiated the instant action a-
gainst the defendants to acquire by eminent domain, their 
property for road construction purposes. The case was 
tried before a jury with the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, pre-
siding. Plaintiff bases its appeal on alleged errors 
committed by the trial court and the failure of the ver-
dict to conform to the evidence. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The issue of just compensation presented by 
this case was tried to a jury on June 17, 1975, before 
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor. The jury returned a ver-
dict of just compensation in the sum of $95,000. The 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•-.( 
plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial which was heard on 
the 17th day of July, 1975. The trial court granted a 
new trial conditioned upon the defendants1 failure to 
accept a $3,000 remittitur. The defendants accepted the 
$3,000 remittitur which precluded the plaintiff from having 
a new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ' 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Judgment entered 
in this case and requests that the matter be remanded to the 
District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff filed this action to acquire prop-
erty held by the defendants for highway construction pur-
poses. The subject property was located at the intersec-
tion of 80rh West and 2400 South Street running West out 
of Salt Lake City. The property consisted of 0.528 acres 
and was improved with a commercial building, one-half of 
which was used as a cafe and the other one-half was used 
as a tavern. (Tr. 136-138) 
The taking consisted of the entire tract owned 
by the defendants, therefore, there was no remaining land. 
The sole issue was the value of the property taken, sever-
ance damage was not an issue since there was no remainder. 
The property owner testified that the property 
had a value to him of $125,000 and that he .would not have 
•^m 
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sold it for less. (Tr. 51, 52 and 56) Plaintifffs ob-
jection to this testimony and motion to strike it were 
refused. (Tr. 52, 56) Mr. Memory Cain, a real estate 
appraiser from Florida testified as to the value of the 
property for the defendants. (Tr. 62) Mr. Cain testi-
fied that the property was worth $90,100, using the in-
come approach. (Tr. 84) Using the cost approach, Mr. 
Cain testified that the value was $92,000. (Tr. 88) 
Mr. Zane Bergeson testified as an expert ap-
praisal witness for the plaintiff. Mr. Bergeson util-
ized the market, cost and income approaches and testi-
fied that the value of the property taken was $59,000 
under the income approach and $54,000 using the cost 
approach, (Tr. 170, 171) and Mr. Bergeson concluded 
after correlating the two that the fair market value 
of the property was $58,000. (Exhibit 16-P) 
Mr. Bergeson used the market approach in formu-
lating his opinion as to the value of the land. (Tr. 144, 
145) Mr. Bergeson testified he used four sales to support 
his land values and gave details on cross-examination. (Tr. 
177, 180) 
The jury after having heard the evidence, re-
turned a verdict of $95,000. (Tr. 223) The amount of the 
verdict was $37,000 over the estimate of plaintiff's ex-
pert witness and $3,000 over the highest estimate of the 
defendants* expert witness. Plaintiff filed a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Motion for New Trial which was heard by the District 
Court and was granted unless the defendants accepted 
a remittitur in the amount of $3,000. (R. 103, Tr. 
of Hearing for New Trial p. 2, 3) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS GRANTING 
OF A NEW TRIAL CONDITIONED UPON PAYMENT OF $3,000 RE-
MITTITUR. 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
11
 (a) Grounds. Subject 
to the provisions of Rule 
61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of 
the parties and on all or 
part of the issues, for any 
of the following causes; . . . 
(5) Excessive or inadequate 
damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the verdict 
....,• or other decision or that it is 
against law. . . ." 
The rule above cited has no provision granting authority 
to the trial judge to change a verdict by granting either 
additur or remittitur. The plaintiff acknowledges the fact 
that the practice of allowing the trial court, in some cases, 
to alter jury verdicts by granting additur or remittitur has 
been judicially established. The party in a lawsuit against 
whom the remittitur or additur is levied has the choice of 
-4-
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either accepting the altered verdict or a new trial. The 
moving party is not afforded this opportunity. 
The argument may be made that the moving party, 
in the instant case, the plaintiff is benefited by the 
alteration of the verdict and, therefore, has no basis 
for complaint. In the instant case, the verdict was re-
duced by $3,000 saving the plaintiff that amount. What 
this argument overlooks is that under the ruling of the 
trial court, the verdict is defective. In the instant 
case, the jury was either influenced by passion or pre-
judice or they did not understand the evidence as pre-
sented or did not follow the law as instructed. In any 
event, the plaintiff was not given the opportunity to 
have its case fairly heard. 
The reduction of $3,000 changes the verdict to 
$92,000. What does this sum represent? It is not what 
the jury found as just compensation. From the record 
there is no indication that that sum represents what 
the trial court felt was just compensation. The verdict 
was reduced to conform to the highest testimony of the 
property owner's witness, Mr. Cain. (Tr. of Hearing on * 
Motion for Netf Trial 1, 2) 
The trial court relied upon the decision in 
the case of Utah State Road Commission v. The Steele 
Ranch, 533 P.2d 888 (1975) (Tr. of Hearing on Motion 
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for New Trial 2). In the Steele Ranch case the Supreme 
Court found the verdict not to be supported by the evi-
dence and reduced it to the highest testimony of the 
landowner. It should be noted that the plaintiff in 
that case did not challenge the remittitur therein 
imposed. It appears that the trial court interpreted 
the Steele Ranch case to stand for the proposition that 
any infirmity in the verdict at trial can be cured by 
the granting of a remittitur or additur to the amount 
of the highest or lowest testimony. 
One may well gleen such an interpretation from 
that case. The court therein cited frailties in the case, 
to wit, the insufficiency of the landowners' testimony to 
support the verdict and testimony as to severance damage 
on property not held in the name of the defendant being 
allowed. The court seemed to assume that a remittitur 
would cure the defects and that if the defendant ac-
cepted it the plaintiff had no right to a new trial. 
The concluding remarks in that opinion seem to support 
this view, the court stated: 
"In view of our dis~ * 
position of this case on 
the grounds herein above 
indicated, it is unneces-
sary to consider the claimed 
impropriety in not allowing 
challenge to jurors." Steele 
Ranch. 
This statement, along with the rest of the de-
- 6 -
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cision seems to indicate that remittitur and additur 
can be used to avoid the granting of a new trial, even 
though there was a defect in the trial that would other-
wise warrant a new trial. The plaintiff in this case 
has no alternative/ he must accept the remittitur if 
the defendant does, even though he does not agree to 
it. This principle runs directly counter to the long 
established principles of due process and the founda-
mental right of all parties to have their case heard 
fairly by a jury. 
The purpose and function of a trial was set 
forth by the court in the case of Chatelain v. Thackeray, 
100 P.2d 191, 98 Utah 525 at 542 (1940) as follows: 
"The primary purpose 
of the trial of a case is 
to render justice between 
the litigants. To that 
end the court has the power 
to exercise reasonable con-
trol over its verdicts and 
when they fail to reflect 
such justice in accordance 
with the evidence and the 
law as embodied in the in-
structions, to set them a-
side, and order a retrial 
of the cause." 
Plaintiff submits that "justice between the* 
litigants" was not the result of the trial in the instant 
case because the verdict was not supported by the evidence. 
If the jury misunderstood the evidence or the law or they 
-7~ 
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were influenced by passion or prejudice the injustice re-
sulting therefrom is not cured by a remittitur because 
the plaintiff has not had the opportunity to have the 
evidence presented weighed and considered fairly by a 
j u r y . • .::-y- :.u'•'•/.- " ./V:^-
There is support in a prior case decided by 
the Utah Supreme Court for altering the amount of the 
verdict as an alternative to granting a new trial if 
both sides agreed to the change. In the case of Wellman 
v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350 at 351, 366 P.2d 701(1961) the 
court granted ci new trial, unless both sides agreed to 
an addition of $3,000 to the general damage award and 
$3,500 to the special damage award. If there are 
grounds for a new trial this alternative is the only 
equitable way of altering the verdict. By making the 
adjustment contingent upon consent of both parties 
neither party can complain of not having an opportunity 
for a fair and impartial trial. Plaintiff submits that 
in the instant case both parties should be afforded the 
opportunity to accept or reject the alteration in the 
verdict and if either party fails to accept it, the 
new trial must be granted. 
The cases that plaintiff discovered relating 
to additur and remittitur all presented the situation 
where the party questioning the ruling of the court was 
~8-
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the party having the option either to accept or reject 
the alteration in the verdict. Clearly in the situation 
of the defendants in the instant action, if he is dis-
satisfied with the remittitur, he may elect a new trial 
or question the court's ruling granting a new trial as 
being an abuse of discretion by filing an appeal. 
The plaintiff is faced with the dilemma of a-' 
greeing with the court that a nev/ trial should be granted, 
but that the alternative given to the defendant to accept 
remittitur is improper. 
Plaintiff submits that the evidence failed to 
support the verdict and the only conclusion that can be 
reached is that the jury was either influenced by passion 
or prejudice or did not understand or wish to follow the 
evidence presented or the law as instructed. Plaintiff 
submits that the following brief review of portions of 
the evidence will clearly illustrate this position. 
As pointed out earlier, the landowners1 testi-
mony was based upon what the property was worth to him 
(Tr. 56), which is clearly an improper basis for estab-
lishing value and also he admitted he had no background .'.* 
upon which to base his opinion (Tr. 56) and further, 
when asked what he based his $125,000 evaluation upon, 
the property owner responded: 
A. "Well, it is my life's 
work and it provided me a 
good living." (Tr. 51) 
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Q. "Would you have sold 
it for anything less than 
that?" (Tr. 52) 
The plaintiff's objection was overruled at this 
point, but the impropriety of the basis for the owners1 
testimony is clear as set out in Point II of this brief, 
and such testimony should have been kept from the jury* 
Mr. Cain, the defendants1 appraiser, in his testi 
mony repeatedly demonstrated lack of knowledge as to crit-
ical facts. In establishing a value on the land taken he 
did not have any comparable sales, but concluded, without 
support, that the land was worth $11,500 (for approxi-
mately one-half acre or $23,000 per acre)(Tr. 83). His 
land evaluation was based solely upon his "experience." 
(Tr. 93) He admitted that he had previously made an ap-
praisal involving a similar type property east of the 
subject tract for $12,500 per acre. In his analysis of 
value using the income approach, Mr. Cain used what he 
termed comparable rental properties. (Tr. 95) When asked 
for information about those comparables he knew very little 
He did not know the name of the tavern he used as a com-
parable located in Granger, Utah. (Tr. 95) He did not * 
know whether or not there was a large advertising sign 
on this comparable property. (Tr. 96) He used the ren-
tal income from this property, but did not know when the 
lease was dated. (Tr. 96) He did not know how large the 
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building in Granger was. (Tr. 97) He did not. recall 
whether or not there was a large awning over the entrance 
of this comparable property. (Tr. 97) He did not recall 
whether or not this comparable had a separate entrance 
to the basement. The comparable had a basement and 
the subject property did not, but no adjustment was made 
for that. Mr. Cain did not know the seating capacity of 
the Granger property. (Tr. 98) He repeatedly indicated 
that his answers were just guesses or "off-the-cuff" 
guesses or he did not recall. (Tr. 96-100) Mr. Cain 
made no attempt to determine the square foot value of 
the comparables. (Tr. 99) He testified that size did 
not matter and when asked: 
»fc* Q. "Mr. Cain, if you had 
a club that had a seating 
capacity of double or three 
times the seating capacity 
of another establishment, 
wouldn't that be a relevant 
factor in comparing the two? 
A. Not if you didn't fill 
- it up. If one was half empty 
and one was full. I am look-
ing at the income they produce, 
not the seating capacity or the 
square foot size of it or what 
the inside looks like versus 
what another one looks like." 
(Tr. 103) 
What is even more revealing is he offered no 
testimony as to whether his comparables were only "half 
full" and the subject "full." In fact when asked: 
- 1 1 -
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Q. "Now, you indicated on 
your redirect examination 
that size doesn't matter if 
you have an empty place. 
It doesn't make any difference, 
a small full place is worth 
more than an empty large place." 
.; A. "That's correct." 
Q. " . . . Do you know how 
much income from customers 
and business Fogarty's had?" 
A. "No, sir. I did not go into 
the books." 
Q. "Do you know the income of 
the Putter Club?" 
A. "No, sir. I didn't go into 
the books." (Tr. 110) 
Plaintiff submits that Mr. Cain had no idea as 
to which places were "full" or "half full" and his analysis 
was, therefore, lacking critical data. 
The other comparables used by Mr. Cain were fraught 
with similar frailties. (Tr. 100-106) With regard to the 
Ludlow Cafe, used by Mr. Cain as a comparable, he did not 
know the size of the building, the seating capacity, the 
age of the building or even what the building looked like. 
(Tr. 105) 
Mr. Cain, in his testimony using the cost approach 
to value used a cost table called "Marshall Swift Evaluation 
Tables." (Tr. 110) The table he used was in the category 
of "Class C Average Restaurant." (Tr. 110) The cost under 
this table included air conditioning, (Tr. Ill, 112) which 
1 r\ 
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according to Mr. Cain, would allow for adequate air con-
ditioning to the building. (Tr. 112) Mr. Cain added 
$675 for air conditioning to the cost table in Marshall 
Swift, even though the table already provided for such 
an item. (Tr. Ill, 112) 
A critical factor in the instant case was the 
economic life of the building located on the subject prop-
erty. Mr. Cain testified that the economic life was 60 
years. (Tr. Ill) There seemed to be no basis for his deter-
mination of a 60 year economic life. The Marshall Swift 
Table used by Mr. Cain in the catagory of Class C average 
reflected a life on such a structure of 35 years. (Tr. 
150) Mr. Cain's testimony contained no indication as to 
why he followed the Marshall Swift Tables in determining 
estimated costs of replacement, but ignored the estimated 
life expectancy of such structure. 
Plaintiff's purpose in pointing out the frail-
ties in the defendants' expert testimony is to demonstrate 
that the verdict rendered by the jury was not supported by 
the evidence and that it must have either been influenced 
by passion or prejudice based on the landowner's testimony 
relating to his lifes work and what it was worth to him 
or the jury misunderstood the evidence. In any event, 
plaintiff contends it was denied the right of having the 
evidence fairly weighed by an impartial jury. . 
-13-
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The circumstances in the instant case should 
be treated as this court treated a similar situation in 
the case of State Road Commission v. Sillimanf 22 Utah 
2d 33, 448 P.2d 347 (1968).. The Court in that case stated: 
"The instant case is a good 
illustration of the princi-
ple that the verdict cannot 
stand when it clearly shows 
'. that it was given either under 
the influence of passion or 
prejudice or under a lack of 
understanding of the law. 
H 
* « » 
State Road Commission v. Sil-
liman, Supra at 37 
The court in the Silliman case did not grant a 
remittitur but set the verdict aside and remanded the case 
for a new trial. State Road Commission v. Silliman/ Supra 
at 37. In the Silliman case the trial judge remitted an 
amount to bring the severance damage award within the range 
of the testimony. State Road Commission v. Silliman, Supra 
at 36. Notwithstanding the reduction by the trial court, the 
Supreme Court granted a new trial because the verdict was 
not supported by the evidence. Plaintiff submits that the 
result in the instant case should be the same as that in 
t h e
 Silliman case, since the verdict is not supported by * 
the evidence. 
In another recent case decided by this court, an 
excessive jury verdict was reversed instead of merely grant-
ing a remittitur. In State Road Commission v. Roy Brown, 
1 / 1 _ 
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531 P.2d 1294 (1975), the jury awarded severance damages 
of $53,378 when the defendants' testifimony was only 
$45,111.51. The court could have reduced the verdict 
to conform to the evidence, but it did not. This case 
demonstrates that alteration of a verdict to conform 
to the evidence is not always a proper means of dealing 
with error committed at the trial court level. Plain-
tiff submits that remittitur in the instant case will 
not correct the error committed at the trial court 
level, nor will it represent an award of "just compensa-
tion." 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE PROPERTY 
OWNER TO TESTIFY TO A VALUE FOUNDED ON IMPROPER BASIS. 
The usual basis for determining "just compensa-
tion" in a condemnation case is the market value of the 
property taken. Market value has been defined as what a 
willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would ac-
cept for the property. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 
Utah 2d 306 at 309, 352 P.2d 693 (1960). A more detailed 
definition is recited in Nichols on Eminent Domain as follows: 
"By 'fair market value' 
is meant the amount of money 
which a purchaser willing 
but not obliged to buy the 
property would pay to an 
owner willing but not ob- • 
ligated to sell it, taking 
_n c_ 
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into consideration all 
uses for which the land 
was suited and might reason- . 
ably be applied." 
' , Vol. 4 Nichols on Eminent 
Domain § 12.2[1] p. 12-62 
to 12-71 
The above cited authorities make it clear that 
the standard in determining market value is what a will-
ing buyer would pay and a willing seller accept. It is 
obvious, based upon this standard, that testimony relat-
ing only to what a willing buyer would pay for property 
unsupported with what a willing seller would accept would 
be improper. Likewise, it would be improper to allow in-
to evidence what a seller would sell property for without 
also establishing that a willing buyer would pay such a 
price. The short of it is that clearly the test is not 
what a seller says the property is worth to him. The 
U. S. Supreme Court addressing itself to this issue in a 
case involving Utah property stated: 
"The Constitution and 
statutes do not define the 
meaning of just compensation. 
But it has come to be recog-
nized that just compensation 
is the value of the interest 
taken. This is not the value * 
to the owner for his particu-
lar purposes or to the con-
demnor for some special use 
but a so-called !market value.1" 
United States v. Petty Motor 
C£. , 327 U.S. 372 (1946) 
• Emphasis added. 
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The Supreme Court of Washington dealt with 
the issue squarely in a case where a property owner had 
testified to value based upon improper criteria. The 
court in the case of State v. Larson, 338 P.2d 135 at 136 
(Wash. 1959) stated: 
"An owner of property 
may testify as to its value 
(without qualifying as an 
expert), upon the assumption 
that he is particularly famil-
iar with it and, because of 
his ownership, knows of the 
uses for which it is particu-
larly adaptable, (citations 
omitted). However, when, as 
here, the owner has not used 
his intimate experience with 
and knowledge of the land's 
uses as a basis for determin-
ing its fair market value, 
but has obviously determined 
it upon the application of 
an improper formula, his opin-
ion fails to meet the test 
and, therefore, has no pro-
bative value." 
The court sustained a motion to strike the 
owner's testimony in the Larson case. The instant case 
presents a situation precisely the same as that in the 
Larson case. The property owner in the instant case 
responded to direct examination questions as follows; 
when asked the value of the property, his answer was: 
A. "A hundred twenty to a 
$125,000." 
Q. "What do you base that 
on?" 
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A. "Well, it is my life's 
work and it provided me a 
good living." 
Q. "Would you have sold it 
for anything less than that?" 
A. "No." (Tr. 51,. 52) 
Later on cross-examination the property owner 
stated that he was not an appraiser and when asked if he 
knew anything about the valuation of property, he replied: 
A. "I know what it (his 
property) is worth to 
me." (Tr. 56) 
Then when asked: 
Q. "And is that what your 
testimony is based on, Mr. 
Johnson, is this what the 
subject property is worth 
to you?" 
A. "Yes." (Tr. 56) 
The plaintiff made a motion to strike the owner's 
testimony because it was based upon improper foundation. 
This motion was denied. (Tr. 56) 
In Arkansas the court reached the same conclusion 
as the court in the Larson case. In Arkansas State Highway 
Commission v. Parr, 246 Ark. 204, 437 S.W.2d 463 (1969), 
the court ruled that a landowner's testimony was not sub-
stantial evidence, since the basis upon which she made her 
evaluation was inadequate. The court in the Parr case 
found the verdict over the testimony of the owner's expert 
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witness but under the owner's was excessive and the case 
was remanded. 
In Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Perry-
man, 247 Ark. 120, 444 S.W.2d 564 (1969), the owner gave 
testimony of what the condemned property was worth to 
him. The court stated: 
"His testimony can-
not be considered sub-
stantial because compen-
sation cannot be based 
on value to the owner." 
Arkansas State Highway 
Commission v. Perryman, 
Supra at 565. 
In another Arkansas case the reviewing court 
found that the trial court had erred in failing to 
strike the testimony of a landowner where it was with-
out sufficient basis and it was based on what the land . 
was worth to him. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. 
Bowman, 253 Ark. 890, 490 S.W.2d 112 (1973). 
Plaintiff submits that the above cited cases 
make it clear that the trial court committed error in 
refusing to strike the incompetent testimony of the 
owner. This failure resulted in opening the door for 
the jury to award damages based on clearly erroneous 
formulae, to wit: his life's income, what the property 
was worth to him and that he would not sell it for less. 
Mention should be made of the case where the 
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Utah Supreme Court sustained a verdict in excess of the 
property owner's expert witnesses and awarded exactly 
the amount of his testimony. State Road Commission v. 
Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P.2d 507 (1970). The dif-
ferences between the Dillree case and the instant case 
are obvious and substantial. The trial court in the 
instant case acknowledged the distinction with the fol-
lowing comment: 
" . . . in the Dillree 
case, the court recites 
that the owner had famil-
iarity with the costs of 
-construction and land values 
in the area. There was no 
such evidence in the case 
at bar, . . . " 
(Tr. of Hearing on Motion 
For New Trial p. 2) 
The distinction made by the trial court is 
supported by the record heretofore cited and the plain-
tiff submits that, therefore, the Dillree case should 
not be controlling. 
CONCLUSION ' 
Plaintiff submits that the trial court in the 
instant case erred in refusing to strike the property 
owner's testimony was based on improper formulae in . 
determining market value. The testimony was prejudicia 
and allowed the jury to speculate regarding damages for 
loss of the defendants1 "life's work" and what property 
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was "worth to him." 
Plaintiff submits that merely remitting the 
amount of the verdict over the defendants' expert testi-
mony does not render the verdict fair and
 just to the 
Plaintiff. The revised verdict does not represent a 
fair verdict of a jury based on competent evidence, 
since incompetent evidence was allowed for its oonsidera-
tion. 
Plaintiff submits the only remedy for the de-
fective proceedings is to reverse the decision and re-
mand the matter for a new trial and plaintiff respect-
fully requests this court to do so. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DONALD S. COLEMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellants 
-21. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
